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Abstract 
Traditionally the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions has been the main source of information about the exchange-rate policies pursued by 
member countries. The classification contained therein has been used to document the evolution 
of exchange rate regimes over time as well as to study the relationship between economic 
performance and the choice of exchange rate system. Recently a number of authors have 
challenged the results of these studies on the grounds that countries may not always be following 
the exchange rate policy that they have announced. For example, many countries appear to have a 
‘fear of floating’ in the sense that the evolution of their exchange rate corresponds to what one 
would expect to see in a fixed exchange rate country even though they are officially following a 
floating rate policy. 
New classifications have been created claiming to represent countries’ actual exchange 
rate policy as opposed to their declared policy. Using the new classification many results relating 
to the evolution of exchange rate regimes and the economic consequences of exchange-rate 
regime choices have been overturned. It is sometimes claimed that the new so-called de facto 
classifications are superior to the older de jure classifications. 
In this paper we argue that neither the officially declared exchange rate regime nor the de 
facto regime tells the full story about exchange rate policy. Both contain useful information and 
need to be taken into account. In addition we argue that countries which claim to be floating but 
in fact have relatively stable exchange rates are not necessarily breaking any commitment as 
sometimes has been suggested. Exchange rate stability may be the result of optimally chosen 
monetary policies. Furthermore, countries that use monetary policy instruments actively to 
stabilize their exchange rate may rationally not want to announce and commit to a fixed exchange 
rate because of a fear of being subject to speculative attacks. We present some empirical evidence 
consistent with this interpretation. 
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  2 I.      Introduction. 
One of the classic readings on the consequences of the choice of exchange rate 
regime is surely Michael Mussa’s 1986 paper “Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and the 
Behavior of Real Exchange rates: Evidence and Implications”. Based on a wide range of 
observations drawn from countries and episodes with fixed nominal exchange rates on 
the one hand and flexible nominal rates on the other, Mussa showed that “there are 
substantial and systematic differences in the behavior of real exchange rates under these 
two nominal exchange rate regimes.” Subsequently a vast literature has emerged that 
looks at differences in economic performance more generally across nominal exchange 
rate regimes.
1 Initially this literature used officially announced exchange rate policies as 
the criterion for classifying exchange-rate regimes. More recently the questions asked in 
that literature have been revisited using a new classification based not primarily on what 
policies countries claim to be following but on the actual outcomes of these policies. In 
many cases the ‘old’ results have been substantially modified when the new ‘de facto’ 
classification of exchange rate regimes is used. This is perhaps most noticeable in the 
case of the ‘hollowing out’ hypothesis according to which countries should be 
abandoning the middle ground of exchange rate options and migrate towards either hard 
pegs or free floating.
2  
 
The recent almost exclusive emphasis on the ‘de facto’ classification has at times 
come close to suggesting that the ‘de jure’ classification based on countries’ policy 
statements is irrelevant at best and unhelpful at worst. Yet, in other areas of economic 
policy, monetary policy in particular, effective communication of policy intentions is 
viewed as essential. From this perspective it is important to take into account countries’ 
statements in addition to their actual actions if we are to understand the properties of 
different policy regimes. This is the objective of this paper. Specifically, we investigate 
whether there are systematic differences in the behavior of nominal exchange rates across 
                                                 
1 For example Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) and Rogoff, et. al. (2003) and references therein. 
2 Rogoff, et. al, (2003) write “Using recent advances in the classification of exchange rate regimes, this 
paper finds no support for the popular bipolar view that countries will tend over time to move to the polar 
extremes of free float or rigid peg. Rather, intermediate regimes have shown remarkable durability.” 
(Abstract). 
 
  3 countries that are ‘de facto’ classified as having a pegged exchange rate. We document 
that properties of the frequency distribution of changes in exchange rates are different for 
countries that announce that they are following a fixed exchange rate regime compared to 
countries that are officially floating. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
countries exhibit ‘fear of fixing’ in the sense that they do not want to commit to a fixed 
exchange rate even though they carry out policies that imply a stable exchange rate, 
which therefore lead them to be classified as having a pegged exchange rate.  
  The next section of the paper briefly contrasts the de jure and the de facto 
classifications of exchange rate arrangements and suggests that neither necessarily gives 
an accurate picture of the monetary policy followed by a country. Section III draws 
attention to the importance of communicating policy intentions and discusses the extent 
to which the announcement of an exchange rate regime actually implies a commitment to 
follow a particular monetary policy. In section IV we characterize the frequency 
distribution of nominal exchange rate changes for de facto fixed exchange rate countries 
distinguishing between de jure fixers and de jure floaters. We introduce and test our 
hypothesis that some de facto fixed exchange rate countries choose not to commit to, and 
therefore not to announce, a fixed exchange rate strategy because they fear that doing so 
would increase the likelihood that they would at times be subject to speculative pressures. 
This section also contains a brief review of two papers that have documented the 
importance of taking into account both what countries do and what they say they do with 
respect to exchange rate policy. Section V concludes with some suggestions for 
extensions of the empirical analysis. 
 
II.  Classifying exchange-rate arrangements. 
  Until recently the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions has been the main source of information about the exchange rate 
policies pursued by member countries. The classification it contains has been used to 
study the evolution of exchange rate arrangements over time, the determinants of 
countries’ choice of exchange rate regime, as well as the association between exchange 
rate arrangements and economic performance. The Annual Report records what exchange 
rate policy the countries themselves say they are pursuing, and as such it has been called 
  4 the de jure classification, even though at least since the end of the Bretton Woods system 
there is no legal commitment implied.  
  It has long been recognized that even though a country has announced that it has 
adopted a particular exchange rate regime, it may not necessarily be following policies 
that are compatible with it. For example, during the classical gold standard, the Bank of 
England did not allow gold flows to have a one-for-one impact on the domestic money 
supply. Later, during the Bretton Woods period, many countries prevented reserve flows 
from influencing domestic monetary conditions by means of active sterilization policies. 
Furthermore, during the first ten to fifteen years of the Bretton Woods system, many 
countries maintained such severe restrictions on the official foreign exchange market that 
parallel markets became widespread. The exchange rates quoted on these markets 
evolved very differently from the officially announced exchange rates.  
  As a result of these differences between the policies that countries have said they 
have been following with respect to the exchange rate and the policies that they actually 
have adopted, new classifications of exchange rate arrangements have recently emerged. 
The best known of these are without doubt those documented in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2004), although others have also been 
proposed in the literature.
3 Although the classifications differ in details, a feature they all 
share is that they are based in part or fully on the actual behavior of the exchange rate. In 
other words, the new classifications aim to describe what countries actually do rather than 
what they say that they do. Hence they have come to be called de facto exchange rate 
arrangements.  
 The  de facto classifications have rapidly become the new standard in research on 
exchange rate regimes. Hypotheses that had been tested using the de jure classification 
have been re-examined, and many results have been overturned. For example, the 
hollowing-out hypothesis that had been suggested by the evolution of de jure exchange 
rate arrangements has been resolutely rejected when de facto classifications are used. 
Similarly, the association between exchange rate arrangements and economic growth, 
                                                 
3 See Rogoff, et.al. (2003) Appendix I.  
  5 inflation, and other aspects of economic performance looks very different when viewed 
by the new classification schemes.
4 
  The new categorization seems to have replaced completely the old de jure 
classification. Perhaps this is the result of the striking finding in Reinhart and Rogoff that 
“Whether the official regime is a float or peg, it is virtually a coin toss whether the 
Natural algorithm will yield the same result” (page 32). This implies that if the Natural 
(i.e. de facto) classification is correct, the old one is virtually worthless for the purpose of 
understanding exchange rate regime choice and consequences. The operative part of the 
previous sentence is ‘if the Natural classification is correct’, and most of recent research 
has proceeded under the assumption that it is. This is no doubt the case for many 
purposes, but we shall argue in the next section that it need not always be so. 
  But first we would like to draw attention to instances where looking at the actual 
behavior of exchange rates does not necessarily give an accurate picture of what the 
authorities in a country are de facto doing.
5 Consider Switzerland. The Swiss National 
Bank claims, and many local observers believe, that the most appropriate label for the 
exchange rate regime in that country is free floating, if by that label we mean the absence 
of an explicit or implicit exchange rate target for the Swiss Franc. Yet an algorithm that 
focuses on the actual behavior of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the German Mark or the 
Euro may classify the exchange rate arrangement as something more akin to a heavily 
managed regime. Indeed according to the Reinhart and Rogoff classification the Swiss 
Franc followed a de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2% between 
September 1981 and the end of 2001.  While this is factually correct, it is misleading as a 
characterization of the monetary policy regime followed by Switzerland.
6 
  The Swiss example can be generalized as follows. Consider two countries that 
follow very similar monetary policies which, to make it concrete, can be described by 
Taylor-type rules for short-term interest rates. Suppose that the countries have similar 
targets for the inflation rate, and that they are highly integrated with each other implying 
similar output gaps. Their monetary policies will lead to very similar short-term interest 
                                                 
4 Again, see Rogoff et. al. (2003). 
5 We are not suggesting here that the authors of the de facto classifications are unaware of the problems that 
we are illustrating. We only want to point out that these may be more frequent than is commonly thought. 
6 Another example is Canada which is classified as having followed a crawling band for thirty years 
between June 1970 and December 2001.  
  6 rates. With highly integrated financial markets the expected exchange rate between the 
two currencies will be constant, and trading on the basis of such expectations will lead to 
a stable exchange rate de facto even though the monetary policy of each central bank 
does not take the exchange rate into account at all. The de facto classification of the 
exchange rate regime will not be able to capture the freely floating nature of the exchange 
rate arrangement between the two countries. This example is likely to become 
increasingly relevant over time as more and more countries adopt monetary policy 
strategies with similar targets and operating procedures. If exchange rates between 
countries with similar monetary policies are stable, as proponents of inflation targeting 
often assume, then a classification that focuses on exchange rate outcomes rather than on 
central bank statements is likely to be misleading. 
 
III. Beyond the de facto versus de jure dichotomy. 
The new classification of exchange arrangements is unquestionably important and has 
already led to a re-evaluation of many findings regarding the evolution and performance 
of exchange rate regimes. This, however, should not lead us to ignore what countries say 
they are doing with respect to exchange rate policy. For some questions the old de jure 
classification is still relevant. Consider the hollowing-out hypothesis. In our view this 
refers to what exchange rate policy a country claims it is adhering to. It is about the 
commitment a country’s authorities make towards a particular strategy. Under this 
interpretation, the hollowing-out hypothesis simply states that countries have become 
more reluctant to announce exchange-rate arrangements that imply some commitment to 
an exchange rate target, unless this is of the hard peg type. Hence we should observe an 
increasing number of countries claiming to follow either hard pegs or floating exchange 
rates. How exchange rates of countries in the latter category actually behave is a different 
matter. It is well known that adopting a floating exchange rate does not define a monetary 
policy strategy. Hence it is perfectly possible that the de facto monetary policy adopted 
by a floating rate country will lead to a relatively stable exchange rate as the example of 
Switzerland noted in the previous section illustrates.  
 
  7   More generally, if we are interested in describing the monetary policy regime of a 
country, then what the central bank communicates to the public may be important. An 
example from the literature on inflation targeting illustrates the point. In a recent paper 
Mishkin enumerates what he considers to be essential components of this policy 
strategy:
7 
“Before starting it is important to make clear what an inflation targeting regime is all about. It 
comprises five elements: 1) the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for 
inflation; 2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, 
to which other goals are subordinated; 3) an information inclusive strategy in which many 
variables, and not just monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting 
of policy instruments; 4) increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through 
communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of the 
monetary authorities; and 5) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation 
objectives.” 
Note the prominent place communication of the policy strategy occupies in Mishkin’s 
view. The implication for exchange rate policy is that what the authorities say that they 
are doing is likely to have a bearing on the outcome. Hence if a central bank claims to be 
following a crawling peg, economic agents are likely to behave differently than if the 
announced policy is a free float. For example, an explicit exchange rate commitment may 
elicit speculative behavior based on the possibility that the central bank may under 
certain circumstances not be able or willing to honor the commitment. Increased 
integration of international financial markets increases the probability that some event 
will make a soft exchange rate commitment unsustainable. Realizing this, the central 
bank may rationally shy away from making the commitment in the first place, leading to 
a hollowing out of the middle of the exchange rate spectrum. Nevertheless, the same 
central bank may find it desirable to limit actual exchange rate fluctuations, because it 
considers these to have detrimental effects on economic performance. We thus see what 
Calvo and Reinhart (2003) called ‘fear of floating’ if we look at de facto exchange rate 
behavior, and we see a corresponding ‘fear of fixing’ if we judge by the stated policy of 
the central bank. 
                                                 
7 Mishkin (2004) page 1. 
  8   This discussion suggests that a full understanding of how exchange arrangements 
influence economic outcomes requires paying attention to both de jure and de facto 
exchange classifications. In fact, doing so helps investigate the importance of policy 
pronouncements as opposed to actual policies. Consider the illustrative classification in 
Table 1. Cells A and D correspond to cases where the classification based on actual 
exchange rate movements corresponds to official pronouncements. As noted by Reinhart 
and Rogoff, the frequency of observations that fall in these cells is much smaller than 
many would have assumed until recently. Cell B refers to a country which says it is 
pursuing a fixed exchange rate policy, but in reality permits currency fluctuations which 
are incompatible with the policy commitment. One would expect that such breach of 
commitment has negative consequences for the economy.  
 
Table 1: Classification of exchange rate arrangements 
    
   De facto classification 
   Fixed  Floating 
Fixed A  B 
De jure 
classification 
Floating C  D 
 
  Countries in cell C are those that display ‘fear of floating’ in the Calvo and 
Reinhart sense, and ‘fear of fixing’ on the basis of the de jure classification. Note that 
there is no breach of commitment here. Announcing that you are letting the currency float 
does not mean that you are committing yourself to making it fluctuate so much as to 
make a de facto classification algorithm put it in the floating rate slot. Economic 
performance may still be different between cells A and C, however, allowing us 
potentially to investigate the importance of communicating policy strategies. 
  In the next section we look at some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that it 
is not only the de facto exchange rate movements that matter for economic outcomes, but 
that information on the de jure classification can be useful as well.  
 
  9 IV. Do Policy statements matter? 
IV.1. Reasons for divergences between de facto and de jure arrangements.  
There may be several reasons why countries ‘fix’ or appear to fix their exchange 
rate de facto without committing to such a policy by announcing a parity. One such 
reason, perhaps exemplified by Switzerland, is that de facto exchange rate stability is just 
an incidental side effect of a monetary policy strategy in which the exchange rate is only 
one of many variables that the central bank monitors and reacts to. A second reason could 
be that the central bank reckons that the economy will occasionally be affected by 
idiosyncratic shocks that will require significant exchange rate adjustments, and it does 
not want to be tied by a previous commitment which might make the adjustment more 
difficult to carry out. A third reason could be that a country does not want to announce a 
parity for the exchange rate because of a fear that it would become the focus of attention 
of ‘speculators’ and would increase the probability of an attack on the currency.  
  These three reasons for not announcing a fixed exchange rate have different 
implications for the statistical distribution of exchange rate changes. If the first reason is 
dominant there should be no difference in the behavior of exchange rate changes for de 
jure fixers that fix (cell A in Table 1) and de jure floaters that de facto have a stable/fixed 
exchange rate (cell C), because for the latter central bank policy is not focused 
particularly on the exchange rate and announcing an exchange rate arrangement does not 
necessarily change the conduct of monetary policy. The second reason implies that 
countries that fix de facto but not de jure (cell C) should show a higher frequency of large 
exchange rate changes, because these represent occasional adjustments to idiosyncratic 
shocks. Finally, the third reason implies that de facto fixers that are also de jure fixers 
(cell A) should face occasional speculative attacks and should therefore show a relatively 
high frequency of large exchange rate changes.  
 
IV.2. An empirical test. 
  In an attempt to distinguish between the three alternatives we used the Reinhart-
Rogoff data base to extract the countries/months that fell into the de facto fixed exchange 
rate classification. We then used the IMF de jure classification as reported in Ghosh, 
Gulde, and Wolf to divide the de facto fixers into de jure fixers (F_fix-J_fix, cell A in 
  10 Table 1) and de jure floaters (F_fix-J_float, cell C in Table 1).
8 For each country and time 
period we then calculated the monthly percentage change in the market exchange rate 
obtained from the Reinhart-Rogoff data set.
9 Our hypotheses about the reason for 
differences between de jure and de facto exchange rate choices relate to the properties of 
the frequency distribution of these exchange rate changes. 
  Table 2 presents some basic information about the observations in each category. 
All in all there are 13095 country-months in the category of de facto fixers. Out of these 
approximately 40% are de jure floaters and 60% de jure fixers. The mean percentage 
change in the exchange rates of the F_fix-J_fix category is slightly smaller but both the 
maximum and (the absolute value of the) minimum are substantially larger. This suggests 
that the de jure classification is not irrelevant if we want to understand the behavior of 
exchange rates. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of monthly percentage changes of 
exchange rates for de facto fixers. 
 
 F_fix-J_fix  F_fix-J_float 
# of observations  7814  5281 
Mean .0041 .0056 
Standard deviation  .061  .040 
Maximum 2.02  .66 
Minimum -2.04  -.34 
 
 
  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the differences between the two categories of de facto  
fixers more specifically. They display the frequency distribution of the (de-meaned) 
observations for each category. The sharp peaks around zero are of course in part a 
consequence of the fact that the observations represent country/months that have been 
classified as fixed exchange rate observations by the Reinhart-Rogoff algorithm. More 
interestingly from our point of view are the properties of the tails of the distributions 
                                                 
8 In our classification we treated all country/years belonging to the categories managed floating and floating 
as floating rate observations. We furthermore excluded Reinhart-Rogoff’s category ‘freely falling’ from the 
analysis.  
9 The sample period for our analysis was the post Bretton Woods period from 1974 until the last 
observation available in the Reinhart-Rogoff data base.  
  11 which are displayed on a different scale in Figure 2. It is quite clear that the F_fix-J_fix 
category contain a higher frequency of large exchange rate changes (of either sign) 
compared to F_fix-J_float category, consistent with the hypothesis that the reason why 
some de facto fixers do not want to announce a fixed exchange rate is that they fear that 




Figure 1: Frequency distribution of monthly percentage changes of  




































































































































Figure 2: Tails of the frequency distribution of monthly percentage changes of  


























  12   Table 3 illustrates the same point in another way. This table is based on the 655 
largest absolute monthly percentage changes of the exchange rates of the de facto fixers. 
This corresponds to the 95
th percentile of all the 13095 observations in this category. 
Compared to the number of observations that would come from each of the de jure 
categories under the hypothesis of equal representation in the 95
th percentile (col. 3), 
column 3 shows that the de jure fixers are particularly strongly represented. A test of 
equality of the observed and expected frequencies yields a Chi-square value of 48.4 




Table 3: Number of observations in the 95
th percentile of exchange rate changes. 
 
  Total # of 
observations 
# of observations in 
95
th percentile if 
distribution 
corresponded to 
actual # of obs. 
# of observations in 
95
th percentile 
F_fix-J_fix 7814  391 476 
F_fix-J_float 5281  264  179 
Total 13095  655  655 
 
  Taken together the evidence strongly indicates that it is not only the de facto 
classification of exchange rate arrangements that matter for actual exchange rate 
behavior. What countries say they are doing also has a clear impact. Before we discuss 
some implications of this for the interpretation of the evolution of exchange rate choices, 
we review the findings of two related studies. 
 
IV.3. Related research. 
  Few studies address the issue of whether the de jure classification carries any 
information about exchange rate behavior over and above what is included in the de facto 
classification. We are only aware of two, Carrera and Vuletin (2002) and Alesina and 
Warner (2003).  
                                                 
10 The result is not sensitive to the choice of the 95
th percentile. In fact, using the 90
th percentile as the 
cutoff, the Chi-square statistic is 70.4 so the difference is even more significant. 
  13   Carrera and Vuletin study the relationship between the volatility of real effective 
exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate regime, the issue that Michael Mussa 
examined back in 1986. The feature of their analysis that is of interest here is their use of 
both de jure and de facto classifications, and the fact that they find significant differences 
in exchange rate variability across de jure classifications for the same de facto 
classification. In particular, it appears that real exchange rate volatility is greater in ‘de 
jure float/de facto fix’ countries than in ‘de jure float/de facto float’ and ‘de jure fix/de 
facto fix’ countries. This suggests that doing what you say you are doing is associated 
with lower real exchange rate variability than doing something that might be interpreted 
as not being what you announce. 
  It is difficult to compare the results of Carrera and Vuletin with ours since we are 
focusing on the extremes of the distribution of exchange rate changes whereas their 
results are influenced mostly by the observations in the center. Nevertheless, they as we 
find that what countries say they are doing with respect to exchange rate policy matters. 
  The objective of the paper by Alesina and Warner is to explain why countries 
might choose exchange arrangements whose de jure and de facto classification differs. 
They hypothesize that differences in institutional quality is an important factor and 
present some evidence showing that countries that announce a fixed exchange rate but 
end up in the de facto floating category, i.e. countries that fall in cell B of our Table 1, 
have relatively ‘bad’ legal and policy institutions whereas countries that fix de facto but 
float de jure have ‘good’ institutions. They interpret the latter finding by suggesting 
“…that these countries are afraid that wide exchange rate fluctuations (especially 
devaluations) will be taken by markets as an indication of poor economic management. In 
other words, these countries peg more than announced to signal stability”. While we 
agree that institutional factors are important in the context of policy announcements and 
outcomes, we do not believe that announcing a floating exchange rate implies a 
commitment to make the exchange rate fluctuate. On the other hand, announcing a fixed 
exchange rate is a commitment, and to the extent that countries want to use policy 
announcement as a signal, the countries that announce a de jure floating rate want to 
distinguish themselves from the de jure fixers exactly because they are unwilling to make 
  14 that commitment even if they believe that a stable exchange rate is generally in the 
country’s best interest. 
 
V. Extensions. 
  Our analysis suggests that countries that follow policies leading to a stable 
exchange rate, and hence are classified as de facto fixers, but at the same time announce a 
floating rate do so because committing to a fixed exchange rate increases the likelihood 
of large exchange rate changes perhaps as a result of speculators testing the commitment. 
If this hypothesis is correct one should see a migration over time from cell A to cell C in 
our Table 1, i.e. from de jure fixed rates to de jure floating rates.
11 Furthermore one 
might expect this migration to be more rapid following the exchange rate crises in the 
European Monetary System when it became clearer than before that fixed exchange rate 
commitments can successfully be attacked. In future work we intend to investigate 
whether these implications are supported by the data. 
  It would also be interesting to stratify the sample according to other criteria, for 
example according to the level of economic development or according to the quality of 
economic, legal and policy institutions as in Alesina and Warner. It might also be 
interesting to split the sample according to the type of monetary policy regime pursued by 
declared floaters, monetary aggregate targeting, inflation targeting or discretionary 
interest rate setting. 
Furthermore, our hypothesis implies that exits from de facto fixed exchange rates 
should be more traumatic for countries that have announced a fixed exchange rate than 
for countries that have not. This could be investigated using the methodology in Asici 
and Wyplosz (2003). 
In general we believe that attempts to study the effects of various exchange rate 
regimes on economic performance should take into account not only the de jure or the de 
facto classification of such regimes. Indeed, the empirical investigation of the impact of 
of policy announcements can benefit from the simultaneous use of both types of 
classification.  
                                                 
11 Splitting our sample period in two roughly equal parts suggests that such a process has indeed been 
taking place. During the first half (1974 – 1985) 74% of all de facto fixers were also de jure fixers, whereas 
in the second half (1986 – 1998) this percentage had fallen to 49%.  
  15   16 
References. 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Alexander Wagner (2003). “Choosing (and reneging on ) exchange 
rate regimes.” Mimeo, Harvard University, June. 
 
Carrera, Jorge and Guillermo Vuletin (2002).  “The Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes 
on Real Exchange Rate Volatility. A Dynamic Panel Data Approach”. Mimeo 
University de la Plata and University of Maryland, August. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo and Carmen Reinhart (2002). “Fear of Floating.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117(2), pp. 379-402. 
 
Asici, Ahmet and Charles Wyplosz (2003). “The Art of Gracefully Exiting a Peg”, The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2003, pp. 211-28. 
 
Ghosh, Atish R.,  Anne-Marie Gulde, and Holger Wolf (2002). Exchange Rate Regimes, 
Choices and Consequences.  Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The 
MIT Press. 
 
Levy-Yeyati, E. and F. Sturzenegger (2004). “Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: 
Deeds vs. Words.” European Economic Review. 
 
Mussa, Michael (1986). “Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and the Behavior of Real 
Exchange Rates, Evidence and Implications.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy, Vol. 25, pp. 117-213. 
 
Rogoff, Kenneth, Aasim M. Husain, Ashoka Mody, Robin Brooks, and Nienke Oomes 
(2003). “Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes”. IMF Working 
Paper WP/03/243. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2004). “The Modern History of Exchange Rate 
Arrangements: A Reinterpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February. 
 
 
 
 
 